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Beyond a Bar of Double-Digit Ratios
STATE FARM V. CAMPBELL'S IMPACT ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS*
INTRODUCTION
Since 1991, the Supreme Court has expressed concern
over punitive damages awards that "run wild,"' but has been
hesitant to set an absolute rule as to when these awards cross
the line into unconstitutionality.2 Nonetheless, the Court has
increasingly sent directives to state and federal courts to use
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to keep
punitive damages awards in check.3 In April of 2003, the
Supreme Court sent its clearest signal yet in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003), reversing the Utah Supreme Court's upholding of a jury
award of $145 million in punitive damages when the
compensatory damages awarded were $1 million.4 Though State
© 2004 Garrett T. Charon. All Rights Reserved.
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
The Court, in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989) hinted that a due process check might exist on the
imposition of punitive damage's ("There is some authority in our opinions for the view
that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award
made pursuant to a statutory scheme .... That inquiry must await another day."). It
was not until BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996), however,
that the Court found that a punitive damages award exceeded the limits imposed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Gore, the Court held in Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) that federal appellate courts must apply a de novo
standard when reviewing a district court's ruling on the constitutional excessiveness of
a punitive damages award. For a discussion of Cooper, see Lisa M. White, A Wrong
Turn on the Road to Tort Reform: The Supreme Court's Adoption of De Novo Review in
Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 68 BROOK. L. REV. 885 (2003).
4 538 U.S. at 412.
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Farm did not establish a bright-line beyond which a ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages cannot exceed,6 it did send a
clear message to the lower courts when it held that awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio will rarely satisfy due process
standards The decision further limited the amount of punitive
damages that may be awarded by hinting that in cases in
which substantial compensatory damages are awarded a ratio
of no greater than 1 to 1 will be allowed. When State Farm is
viewed in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, it is
apparent the Court aimed to send marching orders to state and
federal courts, more clearly than ever before, to rein in awards
of punitive damages.
The Supreme Court's recent punitive damages
jurisprudence has developed amidst a backdrop of political and
academic debate regarding whether and how society should
address the seemingly ever-increasing amounts of punitive
damages awarded Critics have long complained that the
amount of punitive damages awarded is more dependent on the
particular jury that determines it than on the actions of the
" Id. at 424-25.
6 Id. at 425.
7 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 ("When compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.").
8 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of
punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of
punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was
$250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained on
appeal."). See also Mark A. KIugheit, 'Where the Rubber Meets the Road". Theoretical
Justifications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYRACuSE L.
REV. 803, 807 (2002) ("Within the past couple of decades, however, punitive damages
have risen in both frequency and amount to the point where, in many cases, punitive
damages are what the case is about.") (internal citations omitted).
For an overview of the punitive damages debate, see Robert A. Klinck,
Symposium: Reforming Punitive Damages: The Punitive Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 469 (2001). The article highlights Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No.
CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994), the $2.7 million punitive
damages award rendered to a woman who was injured by spilling hot McDonald's
coffee on herself, as a rallying cry for tort reformers. See also Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50
BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi, Why There is No Defense of Punitive
Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998). Contra Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," 'Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches
Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 996
(2003) (arguing "that the supposed litigation crisis is the product of assumption, that
reliable empirical data is in short supply, and that data exist that support any
proposition").
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defendant.' As part of a larger tort reform movement, state
legislatures have enacted legislation aimed at limiting awards
of punitive damages.1" In State Farm, the Supreme Court itself
again stepped into the debate by setting an outer limit on
punitive damages awarded in both state and federal courts."
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding constitutional restraints on
punitive damages with a specific examination of the Court's
decision in State Farm. Part II discusses general criticism
leveled against the Supreme Court's use of the Due Process
Clause to limit awards of punitive damages and looks
specifically at Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in State
Farm. Part III of this Note will contend that federal judicial
intervention best safeguards a defendant's constitutional rights
and does not unduly interfere with a state's right to regulate
the imposition of punitive damages. It will then examine how
State Farm's clear language remedies the deficiencies of BMW
v. Gore and how the cases in which the Supreme Court has
subsequently vacated awards of punitive damages demonstrate
that the import of State Farm goes beyond a mere bar on
double digit ratios of punitive damages to compensatory
damages. The Note concludes with a quick look at the areas of
the law that may prove to fall outside the holding in State
Farm by examining recent circuit court decisions.
9 See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic
That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1167-68 (1984) ("Judges,
equipped by experience and familiarity with legal concepts, are better able than
inexperienced juries to distinguish behavior that justifies punishment, and hopefully
would be able to avoid the bias and naivete that jurors express through inflated
punitive awards.") (footnotes omitted); Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set
Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179 (1998). But see Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743,
779 (2001-02) (arguing that "Ujiuries and judges award punitive damages at about the
same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same relation to their
compensatory awards").
10 See generally James R. McKown, Punitive Damages: State Trends and
Developments, 14 REV. LITIG. 419 (1995). An overview of state legislation aimed at
limiting punitive damage awards can be found at the website of the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA), at http://www.atra.orgshow/7343.
"' See 538 U.S. at 412.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Decisions Preceding State Farm
The recent branch of Supreme Court cases addressing
the constitutionality of punitive damages awards began in 1989
with Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt. Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc. 12 In that case, the Court held that neither the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 3 nor federal common
law could limit awards of punitive damages in civil cases
between private parties. 4 In upholding the punitive damages
award, the Court did, however, hint that due process
requirements might place outer limits on the size of punitive
damages awards."
Over the next few terms, the Supreme Court
concentrated primarily on procedural questions in determining
whether punitive damages awards violated due process. In
1991, the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip"
upheld a punitive damages award that was in excess of four
times the amount of compensatory damages, but noted that
unlimited jury discretion could lead to "extreme results that jar
12 492 U.S. at 280 (1989). Browning-Ferris was the sole provider of trash
collecting services in the Burlington area from 1973 when it entered the market until
1980. In 1980, Joseph Kelley, who up to that time had been employed as a local district
manager for Browning-Ferris' parent company, went into business for himself, starting
Kelco Disposal, Inc. After Kelco saw initial success, Browning-Ferris took action to put
it out of business. Kelco filed suit asserting antitrust and tortious contractual
interference claims. The district court entered a judgment for respondents and
awarded them compensatory and punitive damages of over six million dollars.
Browning-Ferris appealed, claiming that the punitive damage award violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 259-62.
13 The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
14 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280.
" Id. at 276. The Court refused to consider this argument, however, because
it was not properly before the Court. Id. at 277 (noting that the defendants failed to
raise the due process argument before the District Cturt, Court of Appeals, and in their
petition for certiorari).
16 499 U.S. 1 (1991). In Haslip, an agent of Pacific Mutual solicited Roosevelt
City, an Alabama municipality, and wrote health and life insurance policies for the
city's employees. The agent misappropriated premium monies paid and the city's
employees' respective health insurance policies lapsed without their knowledge.
Employees of the City brought suit against both the agent and Pacific Mutual alleging
fraud. The jury awarded damages against both the insurer and agent for both liability
and punitive damages, including damages of over $1 million for plaintiff Haslip, which
included a punitive damages award that was more than four times the amount of
compensatory damages Haslip claimed. Id. at 4-7.
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one's constitutional sensibilities."' 7  In determining that
Alabama's method for awarding punitive damages did not
violate due process, the Court found that the jury instructions
issued and the established post-trial procedures in place for
scrutinizing punitive awards provided objective criteria and, as
such, they were not so unreasonable as to traverse
constitutional boundaries. 8 The Court acknowledged, however,
that the punitive damages award, which was more than four
times the amount of compensatory damages, "may be close to
the line." "
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.," a
plurality of the Supreme Court shifted its focus from
procedural to substantive due process requirements and clearly
stated that a grossly excessive punitive damages award might
in fact violate substantive due process constraints. The Court
again declined, however, to draw a bright-line mathematical
rule comparing the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
that would separate the constitutionally acceptable punitive
damages award from the unacceptable.2 In upholding the
punitive damages award that exceeded plaintiffs actual
7 Id. at 18.
[Ulnlimited jury discretion -- or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter -
- in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's
constitutional sensibilities. We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however,
that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the
court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional
calculus.
Id. at 18 (internal citations omitted).
18 Id. at 22-24.
"9 Id. at 23.
20 509 U.S. 443 (1993). TXO, a large company that was engaged in oil and gas
production, reached an agreement with Alliance Resources Corp. to develop the oil and
gas resources on a certain tract of land that Alliance owned. In exchange, Alliance
received a cash payment and was to receive a portion of the oil and gas revenues in
royalties and TXO was to pay all of the development costs. The agreement also called
for Alliance to return the consideration if TXO's attorney determined that title had
failed. TXO then brought suit for a declaratory judgment removing a cloud on title,
though it knew that Alliance had good title to the oil and gas development rights at
issue. The trial court found that TXO acted in bad faith by advancing a claim on the
basis of a worthless quitclaim deed in an effort to renegotiate its royalty arrangement
with Alliance. Alliance received a judgment against TXO for $19,000 in actual damages
(cost of defending the meritless suit) and $10 million in punitive damages. TXO
appealed, contending that the punitive damages award violated the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 447-51.
21 Id. at 458.
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damages by over five hundred times,2 the Court refused to look
solely to the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and
instead ruled that a punitive damages award formulated
following fair procedures is entitled to a strong presumption of
validity." Indeed, the Court put great emphasis on the
magnitude of the potential harm, i.e. the harm likely to occur
to the plaintiff and other potential victims. The Court noted
that there was a large sum of money potentially at stake, that
the defendant was found to have acted in bad faith, that the
scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of
fraud, trickery and deceit, and that the defendant possessed
great wealth.24 Although the Court recognized a "dramatic
disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award,"
this high ratio alone proved insufficient to render the punitive
damages award unconstitutional.25
It was not until 1996 that the Supreme Court found that
a punitive damages award exceeded the constitutional limits
imposed by substantive due process.2' In BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court overturned a punitive damages
award that was five hundred times the amount of actual
harm. The Court again rejected a bright-line rule and instead
set forth three guideposts to determine the constitutionality of
a punitive damages award: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the
punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases." The Court noted
the possibility that low awards of compensatory damages may
The compensatory damages were $19,000 and the punitive damages were
$10 million. Id. at 451.
22 Id. at 457 ("Assuming that fair procedures were followed, a judgment that
is a product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, there
are persuasive reasons for suggesting that the presumption should be irrebuttable or
virtually so.") (internal citations omitted).
24 Id. at 462.
25 TXO Production Corp., 509 U.S. at 462.
26 Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
27 Id. at 583, 585-86.
2S Id. at 575. The Court laid out the following factors when considering the
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct: whether the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic; whether the conduct showed an indifference to or a reckless
disregard of the health or safety of others; whether the target of the conduct was
particularly vulnerable; whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident, and if the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery or
deceit. Id. at 576-77.
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support a high ratio if a particularly reprehensible act results
in only a small amount of economic damage, if an injury is hard
to detect, or if the monetary value of non-economic harm is
difficult to determine.29 Thus, the import of Gore is two-fold:
first, in its holding that a punitive damages award can violate
substantive due process and second, in its setting of guideposts
to be followed.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
1. Facts and Procedural History
The case that would eventually result in the
reformulation of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of
punitive damages stemmed from a 1981 accident that occurred
when Curtis Campbell was driving with his wife in Cache
County, Utah, and decided to pass six vans traveling ahead of
him on a two-lane highway." A vehicle driven by Todd Ospital
approached Campbell's car from the opposite direction, and
Ospital had to swerve onto the road's shoulder to avoid a head-
on collision with Campbell.31 Ospital lost control of his car and
collided with a vehicle driven by Robert Slusher. As a result,
Ospital was killed and Slusher was permanently disabled. The
Campbells were not harmed.2
Campbell's insurance provider, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, decided to contest liability in
the ensuing wrongful death and tort action, despite the early
determination by investigators that Campbell was at fault and
despite the fact that State Farm's own investigator had advised
them that Campbell was at fault.' State Farm declined the
claimants' offers to settle their claims against Campbell for
$25,000 for each claimant, the equivalent of Campbell's
$50,000 policy limit.' State Farm assured Campbell that he
had no liability for the accident and that State Farm would
represent his interests at trial.35 The jury, however, determined
29 Id. at 582.
30 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 412.
31 Id.
32 Id.
Id. at 413.
4 Id.
35 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 413.
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that Campbell was one hundred percent at fault and returned
a judgment in the amount of $185,849.'
At first, State Farm refused to cover the excess liability,
advising the Campbells to begin the process of selling their
home. State Farm also refused to post a supersedeas bond to
allow Campbell to appeal the judgment against him." Campbell
appealed the verdict with his own counsel. In late 1984, while
the appeal was pending, Campbell reached an agreement with
Slusher and Ospital wherein Slusher and Ospital agreed to not
seek satisfaction of their claims against Campbell if Campbell
would agree to be represented by Slusher and Ospital's
attorneys in a bad faith action against State Farm. " The
agreement provided that Slusher and Ospital would receive
ninety percent of any verdict against State Farm and
guaranteed their rights to control the proceeding by requiring
their consent for any settlement and ensuring their right to
play a part in all major decisions concerning the action.' The
suit against State Farm alleged that the insurer's refusal to
settle the meritorious claims against Campbell constituted bad
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress."
It was not until 1989, after the Utah Supreme Court
denied Campbell's appeal in the original suit, that State Farm
decided to pay the excess judgment against Campbell,
including the amount in excess of the policy limits. 1 State
Farm then moved for summary judgment in the bad faith
action. The trial court granted summary judgment because
State Farm had paid the excess judgment, but that decision
was overturned on appeal.42 On remand, the trial court, at State
Farm's request, held bifurcated proceedings to determine, first
whether State Farm had acted unreasonably in proceeding to
trial to contest liability and, if so, whether this action
warranted the imposition of punitive damages. Campbell
introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to take the case
to trial was a result of its "Performance, Planning, and Review"
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
' Id. at 413-14.
40 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 414.
41 Id.
42 Id. The decision on appeal can be found at 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
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policy,43 showing that a State Farm official instructed a claim
adjuster to change the accident report in Campbell's file. The
adjuster wrote in the file that Ospital was speeding to visit his
pregnant girlfriend at the time of the accident when, in truth,
he was not speeding and did not have a pregnant girlfriend."
The jury then awarded Campbell $2.6 million in compensatory
damages and $145 million in punitive damages. 5 The trial
court reduced the damages to $1 million and $25 million
respectively, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of Utah
reinstated the jury's award of $145 million in punitive
damages.' State Farm then appealed the judgment to the U.S.
Supreme Court.47
2. The State Farm Majority Opinion
In State Farm, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority,' explained that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor, based on
the elementary notion that fairness requires that a person
receive notice of both the conduct that will subject him to
punishment and the severity of the penalty that a state may
impose." Based on this newly articulated standard, the Court
then ruled that the punitive damages awarded against State
Farm were an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of State
Farm's substantive due process rights because the award was
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed.'
In reaching its conclusion that the award in State Farm
was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court retained the three
43 State Farm's "Performance, Planning, and Review" policy was established
by evidence of the company's business practices for over twenty years in numerous
states. The policy was a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping
payouts on claims company wide. 538 U.S. at 414-15. State Farm set monthly caps and
rewarded insurance adjusters who paid less than market value for claims. Evidence
showed that adjusters changed the contents of files, lied to customers, and committed
other fraudulent acts to meet financial goals. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2001), vacated by, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1148.
45 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415.
46 Id. The decision on appeal can be found at Campbell v. State Farm, 65 P.3d
1134 (Utah 2001), vacated by, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
41 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Breyer. Id. at 411.
4 Id. at 415-17.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429.
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guideposts adopted in BMW v. Gore."1 Using the guidepost
analysis, the Court overturned the judgment because the
plaintiffs did not show any prior conduct on the part of State
Farm similar to that which harmed them, 2 the ratio of the
punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award
was extremely high,' and the relevant civil sanctions were
dwarfed by the punitive damages award.'
In discussing the first Gore guidepost, the
reprehensibility of State Farm's conduct, the Court
acknowledged that State Farm's handling of the claims against
Campbell "merits no praise."" The Court found that State
Farm's conduct was reprehensible, noting that State Farm's
employees altered company records to make Campbell appear
less culpable, that State Farm disregarded the near-certainty
that a judgment in excess of the policy limits would be awarded
against the Campbells, and that State Farm first assured the
Campbells their assets would be safe from any verdict and
later told them after the verdict that they would have to sell
their house.'
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
was correct to find State Farm's conduct reprehensible, the
verdict was nevertheless overturned because the Supreme
Court determined that the trial court had improperly relied on
irrelevant evidence and therefore allowed an excessive award
of punitive damages." In particular, the Supreme Court held
that the trial court had erred by considering evidence of State
Farm's nationwide operations that were not similar to the
particular wrongs alleged by Campbell.' The Supreme Court
further held that the trial court erred in relying on actions not
51 Id. at 424-29.
12 Id. at 424. In reinstating the $145 million punitive damages award, the
Utah Supreme Court opinion emphasizes State Farm's nationwide policies. The
Supreme Court held this was not appropriate. See discussion infra page 617.
Sid. at 425.
' Id. at 428.
s State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419.
d8 ,
Id. at 419-20 ("While we do not suggest there was error in awarding
punitive damages based upon State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells, a more
modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's
legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further.").
5 Id. at 422 ("A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its
own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its own
borders, and each State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to
impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.").
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similar to those the Campbells alleged, which caused the trial
court mistakenly to label State Farm a recidivist, even though
the conduct in question did not replicate any prior
transgression."9 Moreover, the trial court mistakenly relied on
its hypothesis that State Farm's actions, because of their
clandestine nature, would be punished in one out of every fifty
thousand cases.' The Supreme Court held, "[d]ue process does
not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to
adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis." 1 In discussing the second Gore guidepost, the
Supreme Court found that the extremely high ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages (145 to 1) cut in favor of
setting aside the punitive damages award. 2 The Court relied on
the fact that the compensatory damages award for emotional
distress was itself substantial and likely duplicated in the
punitive damages award as the emotional distress was caused
by the outrage and humiliation the Campbells had suffered.'
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the third Gore
guidepost, the disparity between the civil penalties authorized
or imposed in comparable cases. The Court stated that the
most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law is a $10,000
fine for an act of fraud, which bore no relation to the $145
million punitive damages award." In discussing this guidepost,
the Court addressed that in the past it looked at the existence
of a criminal penalty in both Gore"' and Haslip& The Court
conceded that criminal penalties do indicate the seriousness
with which a state views the wrongful action, but held that, in
59 Id. at 423.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 415, 426-27.
61 Id. at 423.
62 Id. at 426.
6 Id. The Court notes that the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. c
(1977) states, "[in many cases in which compensatory damages include an amount for
emotional distress, such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defendant's act,
there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment and compensation and a
verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both."
' Id. at 428.
65 517 U.S. at 583 ("[clomparing the punitive damages award and the civil or
criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third
indicium of excessiveness").
499 U.S. at 23 ("We are aware that the punitive damages award in this
case . . . of course, is much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance
fraud under [the Alabama Code).... Imprisonment, however, could also be required of
an individual in the criminal context.").
2004-05]
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determining the dollar amount of a punitive damages award,
the criminal penalty did not have great utility. 7
II. CRITICISM OF THE SUPREME COURT'S PUNITIVE
DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Uncertainty of the Gore Guideposts
Gore, being the first time that the Supreme Court found
that a punitive damages award violated substantive due
process, was a ground-breaking decision." Critics, however,
have remarked that Gore did not establish a workable
analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of
punitive damages awards." This critique is reflective of the
criticism expressed by Justice Scalia in his dissent in Gore
where he observed, "[iin truth, the [Gore] 'guideposts' mark a
road to nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all."" For
example, the Court's discussion in Gore of the second
guidepost, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages, did not provide the precise framework in which it
was to be applied by the lower courts. Indeed, the ratio analysis
seemed largely irrelevant as the Court itself noted that,
although a general concern of reasonableness should enter the
calculation, "[i]n most cases, the ratio will be within a
constitutionally acceptable range."7' The only numerical rule
provided by Gore was that "[wihen the ratio is a breathtaking
500 to 1 ... the award must surely raise a suspicious judicial
67 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 ("the remote possibility of a criminal sanction
does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award"). The Court states that
punitive damages are not a substitute for the criminal process. Criminal penalties can
only be imposed after a criminal trial, with the protections such a trial provides for the
defendant. Id. This shift in application of the Gore guidepost takes away the possibility
of courts upholding large awards of punitive damages in cases where the defendant
engaged in conduct for which he could face criminal sanctions.
68 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies:
Beyond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 263 (1997) ("The most significant
punitive damages reform in recent years came from the Supreme Court's 1996 decision
in BMW of North America v. Gore.").
69 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Pace, Recalibrating the Scales of Justice Through
National Punitive Damage Reform, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1573, 1606 (1997) ("[A]lthough
BMW [v. Gore] is a milestone in the war against excessive damage awards, it will have
little actual impact in the trenches.... [Gore] is sufficiently amorphous to provide no
real guidance.").
70 Gore, 517 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Pace, supra note 69, at
1604.
71 Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.
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eyebrow." 2 This lack of more specific guidance regarding the
second guidepost left Gore open to the criticism that its
guideposts were ambiguous.73
B. Critiques Presented by the State Farm Dissents
In three separate dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Ginsburg rejected the majority's contention that
due process provides substantive protections against large
awards of punitive damages imposed on a defendant." For the
purposes of this note, the critique leveled against substantive
due process limits on punitive damages awards by Justice
Ginsburg is particularly illuminating. In her dissent, Justice
Ginsburg acknowledged that the damages awarded in State
Farm may indeed have made a good argument for damage-
capping legislation, but argued that the issue should not be
handled by the Supreme Court." In particular, Justice
Ginsburg notes that since the lower federal courts do not
participate in reviewing state court awards of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court would be required to allocate
substantial time to addressing punitive damages awards. 6 As
such, she adhered to what she described as the "traditional
view"77 of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Haslip that
72 Id. See Pace, supra note 69, at 1604.
71 In the wake of State Farm, similar criticism has been leveled against it as
well. See Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State
Farm Won't Be the Last Word, 37 Akron L. Rev. 779, (2004) ("Although the Court
obviously intended State Farm to clarify past ambiguities and provide practical
guidance to lower courts considering punitive damage claims, an examination of a
number of recent lower court cases reveal that it fell seriously short in this endeavor.").
Hines points to factors that the Gore guideposts do not adequately address, including
similar conduct on the part of the defendant that harms multiple persons not before
the court, the wealth of the defendant and out of state conduct. See id. at 810.
74 In Justice Scalia's dissent, he states that the Due Process Clause provides
no substantive protection against the amount of punitive damages awarded. He further
states that "the punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW v.
Gore is insusceptible of principled of application; accordingly, I do not feel justified in
giving the case stare decisis effect." 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas' dissent also indicates that the Constitution should not constrain the size of
punitive damages awards. Id. at 429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Neither the amount of the award nor
the trial record, however, justifies this Court's substitution of its judgment for that of
Utah's competent decisionmakers.").
76 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg contrasts this with federal
habeas corpus review of state-court convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, noting that
here, the Supreme Court alone has jurisdiction to review whether state court awards of
punitive damages violate the Constitution.
17 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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state law must suffice "until judges or legislators are
authorized to implement system-wide changes."' Justice
Ginsburg argued that "[iln a legislative scheme or a state high
court's design to cap punitive damages, the handiwork in
setting single-digit and 1-to-1 benchmarks could hardly be
questioned; in a judicial decree imposed on the States by this
Court ... the numerical controls today's decision installs seem
to me boldly out of order."79
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S PROPER ROLE IN REVIEWING
AWARDS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Shared Domain: the Supreme Court, State Regulation
and Punitive Damages
Although states have traditionally monitored punitive
damages awards through both procedural and substantive
limitations on their imposition, such state-developed caps on
punitive damages will remain largely unaffected by the
directive set forth in State Farm.'o Indeed, even in the wake of
increasing Supreme Court review of punitive damage awards,
states have developed sophisticated procedural and substantive
limits on such awards.
State legislative efforts to provide procedural safeguards
include requiring a heightened evidentiary standard that must
be met for there to be an imposition of punitive damages.
Twenty-two states require by statute that the plaintiff
establish a certain level of intent by "clear and convincing"
evidence in order for punitive damages to be imposed, and
another eight and the District of Columbia impose that
standard by judicial decision." Colorado law requires the
" BMW, 538 U.S. at 431 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S.
at 42 (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
79 Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
"0 See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-19.
8' American Tort Reform Ass'n, Punitive Damages Reform, available at
http://www.atra.org/show/7343 (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-
20(a) (2004) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the defendants consciously
or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the
plaintiff'); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie 2004) (requiring "clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant's conduct (1) was outrageous, including acts done with
malice or bad motives; or (2) evidenced reckless indifference to the interest of another
person"); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2004) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness,
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (2003) (requiring that "the
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plaintiff prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a
wrong and that the injury complained of is attended by
circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct."
Many states hold bifurcated trials, with Connecticut and
Kansas further regulating punitive damages by requiring that
the judge impose them independently after liability has been
established.' Montana requires a separate proceeding in which
the jury determines the amount of punitive damages, taking
the defendant's financial condition and net worth into
consideration.' After State Farm, states continue to have
latitude to set these types of procedural safeguards to govern
the granting of punitive damages awards.
Laws affecting the substance of punitive damages
awards, i.e. the amount of the award, are generally not pre-
empted by State Farm either.' Indeed, states have taken
numerous approaches to placing substantive limits on the
amounts of punitive damages awards. Aside from the few
states that bar punitive damages completely,' states that want
to limit the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages
without usurping the jury's role to assess punitive damages
against a defendant, have limited the amount of punitive
damages that can be awarded. Twenty states have passed laws
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence in the
initial phase of the trial, that the defendant acted toward the plaintiff with willful
conduct, wanton conduct, fraud or malice"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(a) (West
2004) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the result
of the defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by
actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who
foreseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.80(A) (West 2004) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence"); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (Vernon 2004) (requiring "clear and convincing evidence
that the harm with respect to which the claimant seeks recovery of exemplary damages
results from: (1) fraud; (2) malice; or (3) gross negligence").
82 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-127(2), 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 2004).
8' CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 2005) (applicable solely to
products liability cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(a) (2003).
84 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (2004).
85 It is possible that a state could impose a cap on punitive damages that is a
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of, for example, 20 to 1. This would be
somewhat affected. The Court's ruling in State Farm would provide greater
Constitutional protection to the defendant, thereby eliminating the use of the state law
in most cases. However, the ratios discussed in State Farm are not a hard and fast
rule-the Court provides for the possibility of exceptions and if a case were to fall into
that category, the state law would still apply.
See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3546 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507:16 (2004) ("No punitive damages shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise
provided by statute"). In Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington, punitive damages
are barred by common law. See American Tort Reform Ass'n, Punitive Damages
Reform, available at http://www.atra.orgshow/7343 (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
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that limit the amount of punitive damages.87 Georgia, for
example, limits punitive damages awards to $250,000,' while
Virginia imposes a limit of $350,000.' Colorado does not allow
punitive damages to exceed compensatory damages.' Some
states tie the amount of punitive damages awarded to the
greater of a specified limit or a ratio to the compensatory
damages awarded.9 ' For instance, Nevada limits punitive
damages awards to $300,000 in cases in which compensatory
damages are less than $100,000 and to three times
compensatory damages in cases where they are $100,000 or
more.' Alabama and Kansas tie the amount awarded to the
defendant's financial position.3 Other states tie the limit of
allowable punitive damages awards to the intent of the
defendant. 4 Of these states that do limit punitive damages
87 ATRA Tort Reform Record, Dec. 31, 2004, 18-30, available at
http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7802-Recordl2-04.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2005). The
statistics are current as of December 31, 2004.
88 GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2004) (the limit does not apply to product
liability cases or cases where the defendant had a specific intent to cause harm or
where the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs).
"9 VA. CODE. ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2004).
90 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 2004).
91 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a) (2004) (limiting punitive damage awards to the
greater of $500,000 or three times compensatory damages in non-physical injury cases
and to the greater of $1.5 million or three times compensatory damages in physical
injury cases); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West 2004) (limiting punitive damage
awards to the greater of $50,000 or three times compensatory damages); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(b) (West 2004) (limiting punitive damage awards to the greater of
$350,000 or five times compensatory damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2004)
(limiting punitive damage awards to the greater of $250,000 or three times
compensatory damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (2003) (limiting punitive
damage awards to the greater of $250,000 or two times compensatory damages); TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon 2004) (limiting punitive damage
awards to the greater of $200,000 or two times economic damages plus an amount
equal to non-economic damages awarded up to $750,000).
92 NEV. REV. STAT. 42.005(1) (2004).
93 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(b)-(c) (2004) (limiting punitive damages awards
against small businesses with a net worth of less than $2 million to the greater of
$50,000 or 10% of the net worth up to $200,000. This applies only in non-physical
injury cases.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (2003) (limits punitive damages awards to
the lesser of defendant's annual gross income or $5,000,000).
See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f)-(g) (Michie 2004) (limiting punitive
damage awards to the greater of $500,000 or three times compensatory damages,
unless defendant's action was motivated by financial gain, in which case, punitive
damages are limited to the greatest of $7,000,000, four times compensatory damages,
or four times the aggregate amount of financial gain); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)
(West 2004) (limiting punitive damage awards to the greater of $500,000 or three times
compensatory damages, unless defendant's action was motivated by unreasonable
financial gain or the likelihood of injury was known, in which case, punitive damages
are limited to the greater of $2,000,000 or four times compensatory damages, or unless
defendant had a specific intent to harm the claimant, in which case there shall be no
[Vol. 70:2
2004-05] BEYOND A BAR OF DOUBLE-DIGIT RATIOS 621
awards, some have exceptions to these limits in certain types of
actions." State legislation addressing the size of punitive
damages awards can co-exist with the Supreme Court claiming
jurisdiction over limiting the awards.
The existence of these state regulations are consistent
with Justice Ginsburg's argument that states can
independently regulate punitive damages awards. However,
their existence does not indicate that the Supreme Court was
unwise to address punitive damages. Rather, the Court was
only setting an outer limit beyond which an award of punitive
damages would no longer be considered constitutionally
permissible.' As with other rights, states may grant its citizens
greater rights, i.e. a state may impose more restrictions on the
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded.97 State
Farm mainly impacts states that have no statutory limits on
punitive damages and decisions where courts do not apply the
Gore guideposts appropriately. An outer limit is necessary for
predictability and notice since punitive damages are at least
partially aimed at deterrence.
cap on punitive damages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)-(D) (West 2004) (where
defendant acted with "reckless disregard for the rights of others," limits punitive
damages awards to the greater of $100,000 or the amount of compensatory damages
awarded, where defendant "acted intentionally and with malice toward others," limits
them to the greatest of $500,000, twice the amount of compensatory damages or the
increased financial benefit derived by the defendant as a direct result of the conduct
causing the injury to the plaintiff and other persons or entities and where defendant
acted "intentionally and with malice towards others," does not limit punitive damages).
95 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(j) (2004) (limits do not apply to actions for
wrongful death or for intentional infliction of physical injury); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-
5.1(e)(1) (2004) (limits do not apply to product liability cases); NEV. REV. STAT.
42.005(2) (2004) (limits do not apply to product liability, insurance bad faith,
discrimination, toxic torts, and defamation cases); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(c)
(West 2004) (limits do not apply to bias crimes or discrimination, AIDS testing
disclosure or drunk drivers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-26 (2004) (limits do not apply to
harm caused by driving while impaired).
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the authority of a state to adopt
individual liberties in its own constitution that are more expansive than those
conferred by the U.S. Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
81 (1980).
9, Id. See also Robert F. Williams, The Third Stage of the New Judicial
Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 211, 211 (2003) ("Over the years, state judges
in numerous cases have interpreted their state constitutional rights provisions to
provide more protection than the national minimum standard guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.").
9" See Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
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B. The Need for Supreme Court Review of State Awards of
Punitive Damages
Not only is Supreme Court review of lower court
punitive damage awards proper, it is necessary. As a practical
matter, legislative attempts to address the substance of
punitive damages awards are hampered by inflexibility since a
law cannot take into account the particular facts of an
individual case that may warrant a larger award of punitive
damages." Justice Ginsburg's admonishment that addressing
excessive awards of punitive damages should be the domain of
the state would provide no protection to defendants in states
that impose no limitations on punitive damages. " In instances
where states have a financial interest in the outcome of a case,
there exists an even stronger argument that Supreme Court
oversight of punitive damages awards is necessary.1 1 Some
states have passed legislation requiring that a portion of
punitive damages awards go to state funds. " This legislation
In State Farm, the Court provides for special situations where the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages could exceed 10 to 1. The Court found:
[B]ecause there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may
not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may
comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages'. . . . The precise award in any
case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the
defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.
538 U.S. at 425 (citation omitted).
100 Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's concern that the
Supreme Court is the only body that can review state court awards of punitive
damages can be addressed by providing concrete guidance to the state and lower
federal courts.
1 See Victor E. Schwartz et al., I'll Take That: Legal and Public Policy
Problems Raised By Statutes That Require Punitive Damages Awards To Be Shared
With the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525, 538 (2003) (Statutes requiring the plaintiff to share
punitive damages... come with their own set of problems.... [Siplit-recovery statutes
may exacerbate the problem of runaway punitive damages, may introduce prejudice
into civil trials, and are socially, ethically, and constitutionally problematic.).
102 See ALASKA STAT § 09.17.020(j) (Michie 2004) (requiring that 50% of any
punitive damages award be deposited into the general fund of the state); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5. 1(e)(2) (2004) (requires 75% of any punitive damages awarded, less the
proportionate cost of litigation and attorney's fees, be paid to the state treasury); 735
ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 2004) (granting the trial court discretion to
apportion the punitive damages award among the plaintiff, the plaintiffs attorney and
the State of Illinois Department of Human Services); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West
2004) (requiring 75% of any punitive damages award to be deposited into a violent
crime victims compensation fund); IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)(b) (2003) (requiring, where
the conduct of the defendant was not directed specifically at the claimant, that 75% of
any punitive damages award, after litigation costs and counsel fees, be deposited into a
civil reparations trust fund); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675(3) (West 2004) (requiring that
50% of any punitive damages award, after payment of expenses and attorney's fees, to
be deposited into a tort victims' compensation fund); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1)(b)
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was passed, in part, in response to critics who argued that
because compensatory damages make the plaintiff whole and
so any imposition of punitive damages should be collected by
the state.' 3 However, if states are allowed to simultaneously
monitor awards of punitive damages and receive part or all of
those awards, there is no check on state actions. '" With juries
granting multi-billion dollar awards of punitive damages,'5 this
can create a situation where the presiding judge and the jurors
may have a financial interest in the outcome of the case. ' 6 This
conflict of interest undermines the argument of Justice
Ginsburg's dissent and magnifies the need for Supreme Court
oversight of punitive damages awards.
C. State Farm's Clarification of Gore's Guideposts
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gore held that
substantive due process does limit the amount of punitive
damages awards,' 7 it is the duty of the Court to provide a
framework through which state and lower federal courts can
(2004) (requiring that 60% of any award of punitive damages shall be paid to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime Victims'
Assistance Section); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3)(a) (2004) (requiring 50% of any
punitive damages award in excess of $20,000, after attorneys' fees and costs, to be paid
into the state general fund).
'm See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive
Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1270 (1987) ("Since the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant for his acts, and not to redress
some injury done to the plaintiff, it is anomalous to permit private recovery of the
punishment. The theoretical justification for the punishment suggests that punitive
damages ought to be paid to the state and not a private party.").
"o4 See McKown, supra note 10, 440-41 (1995) ("State recovery of punitive
damages, especially in actions filed by the state, creates a unique constitutional
question.... The potential for abuse certainly exists.").
105 See, e.g., In re the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2001) (jury
grants $5 billion punitive damages award against defendant).
1 McKown, supra note 10, at 440 ("In most states, especially those with
relatively small populations, the state budget would be significantly impacted by
receiving a portion of a multi-billion dollar punitive damage award, especially if the
award was against an out-of-state corporate defendant."). McKown also predicted that
"it is likely that in the not too distant future some court will determine that the
Excessive Fines Clause applies to at least the state's portion of punitive damage
awards." Id. at 462.
'07 The majority opinion in State Farm holds that "[wihile States possess
discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards." 538 U.S. at
416. Justice Ginsburg takes exception to this statement in her dissent. "It was not until
1996, in [Gore], that the Court, for the first time, invalidated a state-court punitive
damages assessment as unreasonably large. If our activity in this domain is now 'well
established,' it takes place on ground not long held." Id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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apply constitutional scrutiny to these awards. State Farm's use
of clear language and the Court's overturning of subsequent
decisions (without issuing a full opinion) provides guidance to
state and lower federal courts concerning how to analyze
punitive damages awards.
In State Farm, the Supreme Court retained the Gore
guideposts but used strong, clear language to clarify how they
should be applied. Though the Court highlighted its reluctance
to "identify concrete constitutional limits" in discussing the
second guidepost, the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered and the punitive damages award, 8 the language
the Court uses limits that disparity in more "concrete" terms
than any prior decision." The Court held that "[s]ingle-digit
multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while
still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution,
than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or, in this case, of
145 to 1..." This language is an indicator to state and federal
courts that ratios of greater than nine generally will be found
unconstitutional. Though the Supreme Court makes it clear
that there may be exceptions to this general rule, it also makes
it clear that few exceptions will be allowed where punitive
damages awards exceed a single-digit ratio to compensatory
damages.11
When State Farm is viewed in the context of over a
decade of precedent addressing punitive damages, it is
apparent that the Court is providing a clearer message than
ever before for courts to rein in punitive damages awards."2
Indeed, the Court clearly abandoned the view presented in
TXO where it emphasized the strong presumption of the
validity of state court judgments.1" In fact, the Court described
108 Id. at 424.
1'9 See id. ("Turning to the second Gore guidepost, we have been reluctant to
identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award.").
10 Id. at 425 (internal citations omitted). For a criticism of using
proportionality to reduce punitive damages awards, see Jane Mallor & Barry S.
Roberts, Punitive Damages: On the Path to A Principled Approach?, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
1001, 1013 (1999).
' Id. at 425 ("[In practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.").
12 See id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Even if I were prepared to accept
the flexible guides prescribed [previously], I would not join the Court's swift conversion
of those guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching orders."
11 509 U.S. at 457. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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its decision in State Farm as "neither close nor difficult' 1 4 and
found that, at least in the context of the facts of State Farm,
there is a presumption against an award that has a 145 to 1
ratio."5  Significantly, the Court found that "[w]hen
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee.""' This statement
goes far beyond the type of language used in Gore in discussing
the second guidepost, the guidepost most subject to criticism
for its vagueness.
Aside from the clearer formulation of the Gore
guideposts set forth in State Farm itself, subsequent cases in
which the Supreme Court has vacated large awards of punitive
damages provide even greater direction to state and lower
federal courts. State Farm on its own did not resolve all of the
lingering questions that surround punitive damages
jurisprudence. As such, the manner in which the Supreme
Court treats future awards of punitive damages will indicate
how State Farm should be interpreted. The Supreme Court has
vacated several punitive damages awards since State Farm and
remanded these cases for reconsideration in light of its
holding."7 These cases further clarify the approach the
Supreme Court has taken regarding punitive damages and how
it plans on governing these awards in the future and further
demonstrate the propriety of the State Farm holding.
In Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Oregon
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
State Farm. "' The jury had found for the plaintiff, a widow
whose spouse was a smoker and died of lung cancer, on her
claims of negligence and fraud, awarding economic damages of
"1 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418.
"" Id. at 425.
116 id. It must be noted that in State Farm, the Supreme Court found that
"[an application of the Gore guideposts to the facts of this case, especially in light of
the substantial compensatory damages awarded (a portion of which contained a
punitive element), likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the
amount of compensatory damages." Id. at 429. On remand, the Utah court found that
State Farm's conduct warranted over $9 million in punitive damages, an amount equal
to exactly nine times the amount of compensatory damages. Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410-11 (Utah 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct 114 (2004).
11' See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003); Ford
Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 538
U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003); Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003).
118 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
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$21,485 and non-economic damages of $800,000 on each
claim. "9 The jury awarded punitive damages of $79.5 million on
the fraud claim. The trial court reduced the punitive damages
award to $32 million, on the ground that the jury's initial
award was excessive under the United States Constitution, but
the Court of Appeals of Oregon reinstated the jury award of
$79.5 million.2 9 In discussing the reprehensibility of Philip
Morris' conduct, the Court of Appeals of Oregon noted that the
jury could find not only that Philip Morris failed to investigate
the safety of its products, but also that it knew that they were
unsafe and entered on a course of fraudulent conduct designed
to encourage Oregon smokers to continue using those products
despite the danger to their health."2 ' Significantly for purposes
of a State Farm analysis, the Court of Appeals also stated that
it saw "nothing in a ratio of 97 to 1 that raises our judicial
eyebrows, given the egregious nature of defendant's conduct as
implicitly determined by the jury." 22 In making this
determination, the Court of Appeals of Oregon noted that
Philip Morris' actions were part of its business strategy for over
40 years and significantly contributed to its profitability."n
After State Farm, a ratio of 97 to 1 could not possibly pass
constitutional muster unless it fell into the category of cases
where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages." " In Philip Morris, the economic
damages were a relatively small amount, only $21,285, and the
conduct of Philip Morris was particularly egregious-the
company knew that smoking was a danger to the health of its
consumers and it still encouraged Oregon smokers to continue
using its products without advising them of the dangers.'25 In
vacating this judgment, the Supreme Court indicated to state
and lower federal courts that they cannot use State Farm's
exception to the general rule, that double digit ratios will be
unconstitutional, to uphold large punitive damages awards
against tobacco companies.
Likewise, in Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, the
Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court of Kentucky's
119 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
120 Id.
12 Id. at 840.
122 Id. at 841.
123 Id.
1 4 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
125 See 48 P.3d at 839-40.
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award of $15 million dollars in punitive damages where the
compensatory damages were $3 million, including $2 million
for loss of earning capacity and $1 million for pain and
suffering.2M The case was a products liability action claiming
wrongful death.'27 The plaintiff alleged that the defective design
of Ford's C-6 transmission caused the decedent's Ford pickup
truck's transmission to migrate from park into reverse, which
caused the vehicle to crush the decedent against a storage
shed, killing him." When examining the facts under the Gore
guideposts, the Kentucky Court noted that Ford's conduct was
substantially reprehensible, citing the fact that for at least
seven years, Ford knew of the dangerous propensities of the C-
6 transmission and continued producing and installing it in its
vehicles. It also found that the vehicle which killed the
decedent was manufactured five or more years after Ford knew
of the dangerous propensity."u The Kentucky Court stated "tilt
would be impossible to overstate the degree of harm" caused in
a wrongful death action, but that "substantial compensatory
damages were awarded and the amount of punitive damages
was almost seven times compensatory damages. " 13 The
Kentucky Court reduced the punitive damages from $20
million dollars, the amount of the jury verdict, to $15 million. 3'
On appeal, the Supreme Court still vacated the judgment and
remanded it for reconsideration even though the ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages was 5 to 1." This
is evidence that State Farm stands for more than just the rule
that punitive damages cannot be a double digit multiple of
compensatory damages. Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith
indicates that the Supreme Court is serious about reducing
punitive damages when compensatory damages are
substantial, especially if they contain large non-economic
damages, such as pain and suffering. In such cases, a ratio of 1
to 1 may be necessary."
126 538 U.S. at 1028; Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483,
485, 494, 497 (Ky. 2002).
127 Sand Hill Energy, 83 S.W.3d at 485.
128 Id. at 485-86.
" Id. at 494.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 496.
132 Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003).
133 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 ("When compensatory damages are
substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.")
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Unlike Gore and State Farm, both Philip Morris v.
Williams and Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith were wrongful
death cases. By vacating these judgments, the Supreme Court
indicated that wrongful death actions are also subject to State
Farm's limitations on punitive damages. Since a number of
states have exceptions for wrongful death and products liability
cases in their statutes addressing punitive damages reform,'
State Farm will provide an outer limit for these cases that
otherwise would have no limit.
The Supreme Court has overturned two other
judgments involving wrongful death actions, and the state
court in both of those cases pointed to the wrongful death to
distinguish the cases from Gore. The first case, Ford Motor Co.
v. Romo,'3' was an action based on theories of product liability
and negligence in the manufacture of the roof of plaintiffs Ford
Bronco, which collapsed and broke loose in an accident, killing
three of plaintiffs family members.3 ' The jury awarded
plaintiffs over $6 million in compensatory damages and $290
million in punitive damages.'37 The trial judge reduced the
compensatory damages to $4.9 million, but neither the trial
court nor the appellate court reduced the award of punitive
damages. 3' The Court of Appeal of California, Fifth Appellate
District, examined the punitive damages award under the Gore
guideposts, but relied primarily on the "grossly reprehensible"
conduct of Ford, writing, "the conduct here placed tens of
thousands of lives at risk and actually claimed three such lives
in the present case." 3 It also distinguished the case from Gore
by noting that Gore contained only economic damages while
Romo included wrongful death compensatory damages, which,
according to the California appellate court, "d[id] not fully
reflect the harm to the victims."14 Subsequently, the Supreme
'34 See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(j) (2004) (limits do not apply to actions for
wrongful death cases); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1) (2004) (limits do not apply to
product liability cases); NEV. REV. STAT. 42.005(2)(a) (2004) (limits do not apply to
product liability cases); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2004) (limits do not apply to
cases involving drunk drivers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-26 (2004) (limits do not apply to
harm caused by driving while impaired).
135 538 U.S. at 1028.
136 Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 145-46 (Cal. App. 2002).
137 Id.
13s Id. at 167.
139 Id. at 166.
14o Id. On remand, the California Court conditionally affirmed a punitive
damages award of $23.7 million, conditioned upon plaintiffs acceptance of the
reduction. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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Court overturned the California appellate court's judgment.",
In the second case, Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, the Supreme Court
vacated a judgment of the Sixth Circuit that upheld a jury
verdict of over $235,000 in compensatory damages and $3
million in punitive damages."' In the case, the plaintiff alleged
that the automobile accident in which the plaintiff's husband
died was caused by Chrysler's failure to exercise ordinary care
in the design, testing, manufacturing, and marketing of the
1992 Dodge Ram.'43 Dismissing Chrysler's challenge to the
constitutionality of the punitive damages award, the Sixth
Circuit distinguished the case from Gore, stating, "[hiere,
Chrysler's conduct resulted in the loss of life, which clearly
evidences a greater disregard for the rights and safety of others
than failure to reveal that a car has been repainted." '4 The
Sixth Circuit also noted that the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages was not nearly as high as it was in
Gore.'5 By overturning these four decisions, the Supreme Court
signaled that Gore and State Farm apply to cases where there
are damages for wrongful death even when the ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages hardly reaches the double-digits as it
did in Chrysler.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, the California Court of
Appeal also addressed the issue of whether to consider the
wealth of the defendant in assessing the constitutionality of a
punitive damages award. The California appellate court
justified the award, stating, "consideration of the size and net
worth of a corporate defendant was necessary to appropriately
vindicate the state's interest in protecting the lives of its
citizens.'' Likewise in Chrysler, the Sixth Circuit, in affirming
a punitive damages award more than 12 times larger than the
compensatory damages, put much emphasis on the size of the
defendant, stating, "it can be said that automobile
manufacturers are generally on notice that their reckless
conduct resulting in death could trigger a substantial punitive
damages award.' 47 By vacating these judgments, the Supreme
Court not only reaffirmed its position from Gore that a
1 See Romo, 538 U.S. at 1028.
142 540 U.S. at 801.
143 Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461,464 (6th Cir. 2002).
144 Id. at 482.
145 Id.
146 Romo, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
147 310 F.3d at 482.
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defendant's wealth cannot be the sole criterion for the size of a
punitive damages award,'8 but overruled the California court's
opinion that larger punitive damages awards are necessary in
order to enforce the state's interests when wealthy corporate
defendants are involved.
State Farm and the subsequent cases in which the
Supreme Court vacated punitive damages awards' 9 indicate
that the Court did not approve of the method in which some
courts were applying Gore." Though in overturning the
punitive damages award in State Farm, the Court noted that
"the harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not
from some physical assault or trauma" and that the ratio of
punitive damages was 145 to 1," the Court has not hesitated to
overturn punitive damages awards where the harm included
physical injury or even death5. or where the ratio of punitive
damages to compensatory damages was only a single digit
multiplier."
D. Unsettled Areas of Punitive Damages Law After State
Farm
State Farm leaves room for the possibility that the
Supreme Court may declare specific exceptions to the generally
applicable constitutional restraints on punitive damages where
"a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages." 4 Surely, this loophole will be
used by some state and lower federal courts to approve large
punitive damages awards that would appear to fall into State
Farm's prohibition of double digit multipliers of punitive
damages to compensatory damages. Currently, the circuit
courts appear more likely to allow larger ratios of punitive
damages to compensatory damages in cases where plaintiffs
seek to enforce constitutional rights, especially where there is
148 See Gore, 517 U.S. at 584-85.
'49 See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003); Ford
Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003); Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 538
U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003); Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003).
"5 See generally Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Selective Due Process: The United
States Supreme Court Has Said That Punitive Damages Awards Must Be Reviewed for
Excessiveness, but Many Courts Are Failing the Letter and Spirit of the Law, 82 OR. L.
REV. 33 (2003).
... State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.
112 See, e.g., Philip Morris, 48 P.3d at 824, vacated by 540 U.S. 801.
'3 See, e.g., Sand Hill Energy, 83 S.W. at 485-86, vacated by 538 U.S. 1028.
"4 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
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only nominal compensatory damages. In Williams v. Kaufman
County, the Fifth Circuit upheld a punitive damages award of
$15,000 even though only $100 was awarded in nominal
compensatory damages."' The Fifth Circuit stated, "[blecause
actions seeking vindication of constitutional rights are more
likely to result only in nominal damages, strict proportionality
would defeat the ability to award punitive damages at all.". In
justifying the large ratio, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
defendant acted with reckless indifference toward the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and that the
reprehensibility of the conduct is high because it involved
invasive searches on innocent individuals without specific
reasonable suspicion. ' Similarly, in Lincoln v. Case, the Fifth
Circuit conceded that "[tihe Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that our charge is to look closely at punitive
damages awards, in light of the Gore guideposts," but it still
allowed a $55,000 punitive damages award where the
compensatory damages were merely $500.'" The plaintiffs had
brought suit alleging racial discrimination that violated the
Fair Housing Act.159 After trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
$100,000, but, upon review, the Fifth Circuit reduced that
amount to $55,000, which equaled the maximum civil penalty
that could be imposed under Fair Housing Act.1" The Fifth
Circuit justified the large ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages in this case by noting that housing discrimination
cases inherently involve low or hard to determine actual
injuries and that deterring such behavior is important.'"' The
Fifth Circuit's holding that housing discrimination cases
should fall within the exception to State Farm's general rule
against double digit ratios is persuasive and highlights the
flexibility that can be exercised through judicial review of
punitive damages.
155 352 F.3d 994, 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs alleged that the
County Sheriffs department violated their Fourth Amendment rights when officers
performed an illegal strip search on them without specific reasonable suspicion. Id. at
1000, 1004.
156 Id. at 1016.
157 Id.
158 340 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 2003).
159 Id. at 286.
'60 Id. at 294.
161 Id. at 293-94. The Court also notes that actual damages in housing
discrimination cases may be so low that plaintiffs might not bring suit if punitive
damages are not available.
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Two post-State Farm employment discrimination cases
involving large awards of punitive damages have also been
upheld in the circuit courts."' In Bogle v. McClure, the Eleventh
Circuit sustained an award of $3.5 million in compensatory
damages and $13.3 million in punitive damages.1" In justifying
the punitive damages award, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages was 4 to
1 and that the defendants' wrongdoing occurred in the face of
repeated warnings that transferring the librarians was illegal
and the defendants used trickery and deceit to cover up the
transfer under the guise of reorganization." The Eleventh
Circuit noted the substantial compensatory damages in this
case but ruled that because of the reprehensibility of the
defendants conduct, the ratio of 4 to 1 was acceptable."
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, in Zhang v. American Gem
Seafoods, Inc., upheld a punitive damages award of $2.6
million where there was $360,000 awarded in compensatory
damages." In sustaining, the Ninth Circuit highlighted that
intentional discrimination is "a serious affront to personal
liberty"167  and that the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory was approximately 7 to 1. Employment
discrimination, as opposed to housing discrimination, often
includes substantial awards of compensatory damages. In cases
where there are substantial compensatory damages, State
Farm indicates that a lower ratio than 9 to 1 may be
necessary."' In these two decisions, the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits ruled that in cases involving employment
discrimination that ratios of 7 to 1 and 4 to 1 are acceptable.
Supreme Court precedent does not indicate whether such ratios
162 Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347,1362 (11th Cir. 2003); Zhang v. American
Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003).16 332 F.3d at 1350, 1362. The plaintiffs alleged that they were transferred
from their jobs at the main library of the Atlanta-Fulton Library System to dead-end
jobs at branch libraries because of racial discrimination. They brought suit against the
library's Board of Trustees and its Director. Id. at 1350.
" Id. at 1361-62.
16 Id. at 1362
16 339 F.3d at 1027, 1045. Plaintiff sued his former employer for employment
discrimination under federal law and breach of contract, claiming that he was fired due
to his Chinese ethnicity and nationality. Id. at 1024.
167 Id. at 1043. The Court further states, "There can be no question of the
importance of our society's interest in combating discrimination. . . .Freedom from
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity is a fundamental human right ... " Id.
(internal citations omitted).
168 See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
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will be allowed under State Farm in employment
discrimination cases; however, the argument that State Farm's
discussion of ratios does not fit well in discrimination cases is
not as strong in cases of employment discrimination because of
the likelihood of substantial compensatory damages.'69
IV. CONCLUSION
State Farm clarified the outer boundaries of permissible
punitive damages, affirming that the Supreme Court is serious
about reining in punitive damages and providing a more
concrete framework for all courts to do so. However, while
generally setting outer limits on punitive damages awards, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the generally acceptable
ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages may be
stretched where particularly reprehensible conduct does not
result in a large amount of economic damages. As illustrated by
the cases involving violations of constitutional rights, it is clear
that the circuit courts have begun to carve out exceptions to
State Farm. In order for their to be predictability regarding the
amount of punitive damages to which a defendant may be
subject, the Supreme Court will need to take an active role in
determining what specific cases will fall into the scope of the
exception that it carved out. How closely the Court monitors
large awards of punitive damages and how often it vacates
such awards in the future will indicate whether the strong
language of State Farm was another sure, albeit cautious, step
into the waters of federal judicial oversight of punitive
damages or mere dicta to be ignored at the will of state and
lower federal court judges.
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